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Jonathan Macey’s new book, Corpo-
rate Governance: Promises Kept, Prom-
ises Broken, provides insight into how 
corporations are run, and, in so doing, 
takes aim at some traditional theories 
of governance. Given the governance 
failures in our post-Enron environ-
ment, now is a particularly good time 
to read this book.
I started paying attention to corpo-
rate governance issues when we began 
to study the failures of Enron, World-
Com, and the other fiascos of the early 
2000s. As I read about the mistakes 
that the Enron board made, I won-
dered why so many very smart people 
could make so many really dumb deci-
sions. How difficult is it to say “no” 
to a chief financial officer who wants 
to engage in self-dealing with his own 
company? Apparently, the Enron board 
found it impossible to say “no” to Andy 
Fastow, Enron’s own CFO (who made 
a personal profit of over $40 million in 
his deals with Enron, and who’s now 
serving time for his crimes). Enron 
waived its own ethics rules to allow 
Fastow to sit across from Enron at the 
bargaining table and to let Fastow help 
Enron hide poorly performing deals 
from easy discovery. (Here’s a clue, 
board members: if what you’re consid-
ering involves waiving an ethics rule at 
all, just don’t do it.)
Some good things came out of 
Enron’s governance failures, although 
not very many good things. Probably 
the most important good thing was 
that more people started to pay atten-
tion to corporate governance—and to 
what distinguishes good governance 
from bad governance. I’ve noticed 
that board membership has started 
to become less decorative (although 
most boards are still not very diverse 
in terms of gender or skill sets). Peo-
ple have started to take their board 
responsibilities more seriously. Board 
members are paying more attention to 
financial statements. All of these devel-
opments are good.
But we still have a long way to go. 
Boards continue to overcompensate 
their officers and award bonuses for 
short-term behavior that can ruin com-
panies in the long run. They’re still 
allowing their companies to engage in 
short-term, high-risk ventures without 
necessarily understanding exactly the 
level of risk that those ventures involve. 
Macey’s book helps to explain why, 
despite our best efforts, we really haven’t 
learned all that much from Enron.
What I admire most about this book 
is that he comes out swinging about 
whether even smart boards actually 
do any good at all. I wish I’d written 
this book, although I could never have 
done it with the same flair and wis-
dom that Macey has done. So I’m glad 
he’s said what I’d been thinking: that 
no amount of brains or talent can fix 
this system by assuming that boards 
can really govern.
This book really is too chock-full 
of good points to do it justice in a 
short book review, so this review will 
focus on his discussion about boards 
(Chapters 4 and 5). He highlights 
the difference between managing and 
monitoring:
The intuition that directors add 
value is strong and deeply held. 
That intuition is not challenged 
here. What is challenged is the 
deeply held assumption that tradi-
tional directors add value by serv-
ing shareholders as independent 
monitors of managers. It is more 
likely that directors nominated and 
elected through traditional board 
processes serve managers by sup-
porting them. Sometimes, particu-
larly when managers have useful 
and constructive strategic advice for 
management, directors add value 
for shareholders. At other times, 
however, such as when managers 
need directors to approve manag-
ers’ aggressive salary requirements 
or when managers need insulation 
from the market for corporate con-
trol or pesky institutional investors, 
so-called independent directors 
at best do not reduce shareholder 
value, and at worst they destroy it. 
(Macey at 51.) 
That’s a strong statement, but is 
there anyone who has read the finan-
cial news over the past year or so who 
can really disagree with it?
Part of Macey’s strength in this book 
comes from his willingness to debunk 
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the traditional notion that corporate 
governance comes not from a contract 
(real or imagined) between share-
holders and the company, but from 
the “investors’ legitimate investment-
backed expectations.” Those expecta-
tions, which include the expectation 
that the company’s managers won’t 
steal from the corporation or lie to the 
public, just aren’t monitored well by 
directors who have been handpicked 
by the managers themselves. There’s 
nothing nefarious in this assertion. 
People tend to prefer to be in collegial 
groups, and it’s difficult to be a nay-
sayer who slows down a group’s deci-
sion making.
But Macey also shows us what hap-
pens when these collegial groups have 
to make some hard decisions. Point-
ing to such common problems as 
board capture, Macey explains that 
“it is virtually impossible to identify, 
much less to monitor and control, 
the myriad ways that board inde-
pendence can be compromised.” In 
Chapter 5, he gives us examples of 
what I call big, boneheaded board 
mistakes. The Disney board’s hir-
ing and firing of Michael Ovitz and 
the Enron board’s willingness to opt 
out of any use of common sense—
two of the best-known examples of 
big, boneheaded mistakes in recent 
U.S. corporate law—demonstrate just 
how easily smart people can, subcon-
sciously, force each other to make bad 
decisions.
There is a lot of solid social sci-
ence that explains why smart people 
end up doing some very dumb things. 
What Macey’s book demonstrates so 
convincingly is that blindly putting 
our trust in any governance structure 
(whether it’s boards, or regulations, or 
derivative suits), without understand-
ing that humans have certain cognitive 
biases, will result in us leaving the les-
sons of corporate fiascos on the table. 
The best laws, the most conscientious 
directors, and the most favorable dis-
pute resolution climate still can’t over-
come human nature. Any governance 
system that doesn’t understand that 
humans can be pressured into group-
think, and that humans can talk them-
selves into walking on the wrong side 
of the ethical line, is a governance sys-
tem that’s doomed to fail.
I was in a cab the other day, rid-
ing to a lecture and talking with the 
cabdriver about the economy. “You 
know,” he said, “the really sad thing 
is that, when Enron went down, we 
thought that that was the worst thing 
in the world. Too bad we didn’t real-
ize that Enron was part of the good 
times, compared to what we have 
now.” We’re suffering now in large 
part because businesses have contin-
ued to make bad decisions—decisions 
blessed by their boards—without 
some sort of “loyal opposition” (per-
haps a new officer—the Chief Nay-
sayer?) to slow down the groupthink. 
Now that we have a good new book 
that gives us more insight into how 
boards work (or how they don’t), let’s 
take that next step. 
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